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Abstract 
 
This paper aims at establishing the link between economic performance, financial depth and 
financial stability in the European Union from 1998 to 2011. We use the standard framework 
– both in terms of variables and econometric method – of Beck and Levine (2004) to estimate 
these relationships. Our results suggest that the traditional result that financial depth 
positively influences economic performance (or components of aggregate dynamics like 
consumption, investment or disposable income) is not confirmed for European countries. 
Furthermore, we use different measures of financial instability (institutional index, 
microeconomic indicators, and our own statistical index derived from a Principal 
Component Analysis) and find that financial instability has a negative effect on economic 
growth.  
 
Keywords: Financial depth; Aggregate dynamics; Financial stability, Banks, Non-
performing loans, CISS, Z-score, Principal Component Analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the relationship between macroeconomic performance, financial depth 
and financial stability in the European Union (EU). Different views emerged from the 
literature on the links between finance and economic performance. On the one hand, credit 
is found to be determinant in the process of economic development. The literature often 
recalls the Schumpeterian view that entrepreneurs need credit to finance their innovations. 
Banks and financial markets are then viewed as facilitators. On the other hand, finance 
development appears to respond to economic growth. With economic expansion, firms and 
households are more likely to demand financial services. In both cases, the finance-growth 
relationship seems to be constrained by structural determinants such as the historical level 
of debt, the legal environment or the level of economic development. Beyond this finance-
growth nexus, we investigate whether financial instability affects macroeconomic 
performance. 
 
Focusing on the financial stability issue is motivated from both an academic and a policy 
perspective. This topic has emerged in the academic debate since the crisis (Arcand et al., 
2012 ; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012 ; Beck et al., 2014). A major reason for addressing the 
question of financial stability is its public good’s nature (see e.g. Boyer et al., 2004): it is a 
non-rival good since its use does not prevent someone else from the same use, and it is non-
excludable since no one can be deprived from its use. After financial crises, new regulations 
are proposed to supervise and frame the financial system to preserve its properties as a 
public good (Cartapanis, 2011). In the case of a banking crisis at the micro level, financial 
stability has to be preserved to avoid that idiosyncratic shocks have a systemic impact 
through different contagion links: contractual, informational or psychological (Borio, 2003). 
For instance, Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in September 2008 has affected the whole 
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banking system through several channels. Contractually, its creditors were the first to be hit. 
But very quickly, bankruptcy was analysed as a severe negative signal on financial markets 
and, in particular, on interbank markets. It induced uncertainty and suspicion among 
banking institutions that became suddenly reluctant to participate to the money market. 
This informational or psychological link was transmitted all over the world and extreme 
tensions appeared on the European’s and US’ money markets, and consequently, affected 
the real economy. Moreover, payment systems are central to the smooth functioning of 
market economies and financial instability could potentially disrupt these.  
 
European countries included financial stability in the European Treaty as an objective of the 
European Central Bank. According to Article 127(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, the ECB has “to smooth the conduct of policies pursued by the competent 
authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the 
financial system”. But beyond this mandate, its policy formulation is difficult to achieve 
because of the difficulties to define, forecast and measure financial stability (see Schinasi, 
2004). In the absence of a consensus, it is acknowledged that these regulations should at least 
be implemented at the European level. The banking union is one step in that direction. The 
EU is thus an adequate level to investigate the finance-economic performance relationship, 
all the more so as European countries, thanks to financial integration and converging 
prudential regulations, are relatively homogenous compared to the rest of the world.  
 
Our study documents this need for regulation in providing evidence about the effects of 
financial depth and financial stability on aggregate dynamics. First, we assess the finance-
economic performance nexus in the EU. Our dynamic panel estimations follow the 
methodology of Beck and Levine (2004), hence producing results that are comparable across 
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a wide array of the literature and robust to the use of alternative panel specifications. On a 
sample of all European countries from 1998 to 2011, we show that financial depth does not 
have a positive effect on economic performance and its subcomponents: consumption, 
investment and disposable income. Moreover, we find that financial depth may have a 
negative impact on economic performance. This result is, to our knowledge, original to the 
literature and supports the view that the previously highlighted positive effect depends on 
the level of financial development. Second, we assess the effect of financial stability on 
economic performance. We use different financial instability indicators that measure the 
macro and the micro dimension of financial stability: the Composite Indicator of Systemic 
Stress (CISS) provided by the ECB, aggregate prudential ratios for domestic banks for each 
country, stock market volatility and our own statistical index constructed with a Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA). We find that financial instability has a negative effect on 
economic performance, without affecting the financial depth effect. These results suggest 
that the level of financial depth in the EU is such advanced that finance depth has no longer 
a positive effect on economic growth. On the contrary, the deepening of finance bears some 
risks through the negative effects induced by financial instability. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature. 
Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 the methodology and results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature 
This paper is related to the literature studying the link between finance and economic 
growth, and to the literature investigating the link between financial instability and growth. 
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2.1 Finance and Economic Performance 
Different perspectives on the relationship between finance and economic performance have 
been emphasized, and theoretical and empirical controversies on this subject exist since the 
beginning of the XXth century (Ang, 2008). The debate can be summed up as follows. Pros 
highlight that the development of finance induces a better allocation of resources, mobilizes 
savings, can reduce risks and facilitates transactions. The financial sector acts as a lubricant 
for the economy, ensuring a smoother allocation of resources and the emergence of 
innovative firms. Cons recall that stock markets have destabilizing effects and that finance 
liberalization leads to financial crises. These more sceptical authors believe that the link 
between finance and economic growth is exaggerated (Stiglitz, 2000; Rodrik and 
Subramanian, 2009). De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) argue that the link is tenuous or even 
non-existent in the developed countries and suggest that once a certain level of economic 
wealth has been reached, the financial sector makes only a marginal contribution to the 
efficiency of investment. It abandons its role as a facilitator of economic growth in order to 
focus on its own growth. This generates banking and financial groups that are finally “too 
big to fail”, enabling these entities to take excessive risk since they know it will be 
mutualised via public authorities’ interventions. Their fragility rapidly transmits to other 
corporations and to the real economy. The subprime crisis is certainly a good example of the 
power and magnitude of the effects of correlation and contagion on financial markets. 
Numerous empirical studies have investigated these questions. However, until recently, the 
literature highlighted a positive relationship between financial development and economic 
growth (Bumann et al., 2013). We can distinguish between cross-country, time series and 
panel studies. 
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Cross-country studies, mixing countries with different levels of development, generally 
found a positive effect of finance on economic performance with the notable exception of 
Ram (1999). King and Levine (1993) found that financial development indicators are 
positively associated with capital accumulation, total factor productivity growth and GDP 
growth. Focusing on the stock markets’ influence Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) 
and Levine and Zervos (1998) concluded that liquid stock markets are positively related to 
GDP growth. Nevertheless, these cross-country studies suffer from severe limits. Most of 
them only intend to quantify how finance affects economic performance, neglecting the 
reverse causality. When they deal with this endogeneity bias, they include instrumental 
variables. But, as demonstrated by Ahmed (1998), this technique is not robust when data are 
averaged over decades, which is usually the case. Another limit of these cross-country 
analyses is the grouping of countries that are highly heterogenous. This problem is 
highligted by Ram (1999) who show that after defining subgroups into his sample, an 
important parametric heterogeneity is observed. This is due to the fact that the link 
beetween finance and economic performance is mainly determined by the financial 
structures, the legal environment, the preferences and the policies implemented in each 
country (Arestis and Demetriades, 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998).  
 
Time series studies have been developed in contrast to the above-mentioned limits. Arestis 
and Demetriades (1997) compare the finance-GDP growth link in Germany and in the 
United States. They find in Germany a relationship going from finance development to real 
GDP, whereas the reverse causal pattern runs for the United States. Xu (2000) also provides 
evidence of heterogeneity across countries. Arestis et al. (2001) compare the influence of 
banks and stock markets accross five developed countries. Their results show that both 
banks and stock markets promote GDP growth. But they also suggest that banks’ 
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contribution is stronger than the stock markets’. Moreover, they point out that stock 
markets’ volatility has negative effects in Japan, France and the United Kingdom. This 
variety of results can be interpreted as a limit to time-series analysis. These studies also 
suffer from small sample constraints. To preserve degrees of freedom, variables included in 
the analysis are kept to a minimun and these studies are subject to the omitted variable bias.  
 
To address theses issues and to combine the benefits of cross-country analysis and time 
dimension, the literature moved to dynamic panel estimation procedures. Most of panel 
studies achieve the conclusion that financial development has a positive effect on economic 
performance, e.g. Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000), Rioja and Valev (2004), Rousseau and 
Wachtel (2000), Beck and Levine (2004) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) with industry-level 
data. Beck and Levine (2004), using dynamic panel data estimation, developed an empirical 
methodology based on Arellano and Bond (1991) that intends to take care of the endogeneity 
bias. They explain GDP per capita growth by means of the usual variables of the 
endogenous growth theory (i.e. the initial GDP per capita, the accumulation of human 
capital over the average years of education, government consumption, trade openness and 
inflation) and add to their model credit to the private sector and the turnover ratio as proxies 
of financial depth. They find that overall financial development impacts positively GDP 
growth. The turnover ratio and credit to the private sector are both significant suggesting 
that they complement each other. Nevertheless, the main conclusion that finance improves 
growth can be moderated. Calderon and Liu (2003) also find that financial development 
generally leads to economic growth, but they show that the causality from economic growth 
to financial development coexists. They find that the finance-growth link is more active in 
developing countries than in developed ones and that the longer the sample, the larger the 
effect of financial development.  
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In an attempt to reconcile the divergent views expressed in the literature, a nonlinear 
relationship between finance and economic growth has been postulated. Arcand et al. (2012) 
extend Beck and Levine (2004) by introducing credit to the private sector and the square of 
this variable in order to take account of potential non-linearity of financial depth. They are 
thus able to show that the relationship between economic growth and private sector credit is 
positive, but that the relationship between economic growth and the square of private sector 
credit (that is to say, the effect of credit to the private sector when it is at a high level) is 
negative. Taken together, these two factors indicate a concave relationship between 
economic growth and credit to the private sector: the relationship is positive up to a certain 
level of financial depth, and beyond a threshold, the effects of financial depth become 
negative. According to the different specifications estimated by Arcand et al. (2012), the 
threshold (as a percentage of GDP) lies between 80% and 100% of credit to the private sector. 
Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) come to similar results and make clear that these thresholds 
should not be viewed as targets, but more like “extrema” that might be reached only in 
times of crisis. In “normal” times, it would be better that private debt levels are lower so as 
to give the economies some manoeuvring room in times of crisis. To explain non-linearities, 
Aghion et al. (2005) and Fung (2009) argue that financial develoment helps catch-up the 
productivity frontier; for countries close to the frontier, positive effects from financial depth 
are limited or nonexistent.1 Beck et al. (2012) insist on the fact that finance growth effect 
stems from firms rather than households. However, in developed countries, financial 
deepening originates from more households’ lending. This may explain the weakness of the 
finance effect in high-income countries. It is worth acknowledging that those explanations 
do not exclude each other. They might even reinforce themselves and create an excess of 
finance that degenerates into financial instability.                                                         
1 Philippon (2010) argue that the financial system grows faster than the real economy, with the consequence being that young 
talents are more attracted by the financial sector than the nonfinancial one.   
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Beyond questions of non-linearity, finance can also have its own potential negative effects. 
Indeed, liquidity and maturity transformation from deposit and savings to long-term 
investments can improve economic performance but can also be damaging. Deregulation 
and information asymmetries have encouraged banks to take more and more risks in recent 
years. Combined with financial deepening, it led to excessive lending, and reinforced 
bubbles that create conditions for financial fragility. The failure of financial institutions can 
have strong negative externalities. Laeven and Valencia (2012) show that banking crises tend 
to have larger real effects in advanced economies. Output losses are driven by deeper 
banking systems that impact deeply on the whole the economy.  
 
2.2 Financial Stability 
Schinasi (2004) proposes to define financial stability from its different characteristics, such as 
“enhancing economic processes, manage risks and absorb shocks”. Financial stability 
represents the ability of a financial system to smoothly absorb the shocks the system has to 
face. Financial stability is a wide concept that relates to different aspects in finance. On a 
micro level, it refers to the market structures (a high degree of concentration reinforces the 
contagion risks from one bank to another) and to financial institutions themselves 
(depending on the fact that their business model requires high or low risk). On a macro 
level, it also relates to the monetary stability and to the functioning of the payment system. 
These domains are organised and supervised by central banks, supervisory authorities and 
private firms that ensure the functioning of the payment system between the financial 
institutions. Failures in the supervision or in the payment system may lead to financial 
instability.  
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One way to define financial stability is to take into account the ways to achieve it. Two main 
paradigms classify financial stability (see e.g. Borio, 2003): the macroprudential and 
microprudential ones. Macroprudential policies try to limit the occurrence of financial crisis 
in order to limit its impact on welfare. Microprudential policies try to limit financial 
institutions’ probability of bankruptcy and idiosyncratic shocks. 2 Financial instability is 
exogenous to the financial system, and risks shoud be managed on an individual basis. This 
is a bottom-up approach and spillover effects between institutions are irrelevant. 
Macroprudential policies focus on the economic system as a whole and are aimed at 
circumscribing shocks that may have a macro impact.3 Risks come from the system itself and 
the spillovers between institutions are important. Financial stability is generated through a 
top-down perspective, guaranteed by the actions of main financial institutions.  
 
The complexity to define conceptually financial stability also involves various ways to 
quantify it. The ECB has developed a Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS) for the 
euro area as a whole (Hollo et al., 2012), available since 1999; it gives an appreciation of the 
macroeconomic financial stability. At the micro level, several authors capture financial 
stability in the banking sector through the Z-score (Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009; Fink et al., 
2009) that measures the probability of default for a bank or a banking system. Nevertheless, 
this indicator suffers from several limitations (Čihák et al., 2012). Using the financial stress 
index4 developped by the IMF for thirteen industrialized economies, Proaño et al. (2013) 
analyze how the effect of the sovereign debt-to-GDP ratio on economic growth depends on 
financial stability and find that the debt-to-GDP ratio impairs economic growth only if 
financial stress is high.                                                         
2 Its main objective is to guarantee a protection for the consumers (investors, depositors, etc…). 
3 Its main objective is to avoid economic costs in terms of GDP or unemployment stemming from financial instability. 
4 This is a composite indicator comprising information on the banking-sector volatility, stock market returns, stock market 
volatility, sovereign debt spreads, and an exchange market pressure index, very similar in spirit to the CISS for the EU. 
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3. Data 
To quantify the links between financial depth, financial stability and economic performance 
in the EU, our data set is composed of country-variables from the 27 EU member states as of 
2011.5 We use annual data between 1998 and 2011.  
 
3.1. Economic Performance 
The main indicator of economic performance is the real GDP per capita growth rate, as in 
many papers dedicated to the real impact of finance. Following Stiglitz et al. (2009) who 
indicate that two other macro agregates are relevant to explain the economic performance, 
we include the real disposable income per capita growth rate and the household 
consumption per capita growth rate. Finally, we also analyse the impact of finance over 
private investment growth, measured as the growth rate of real gross fixed capital 
formation. 
 
3.2. Explanatory variables  
In order to compare our results with the conclusions of the literature, we include as 
explanatory variables: initial economic performance per capita, average years of education, 
government consumption over GDP, trade openness and inflation6. All these variables are 
expressed in log.7  
 
Moreover, we include a measure of financial depth. Beck and Levine (2004) use the total of 
credit to the private sector from deposit banks. This measure was adequate until the 1990’s 
                                                        
5 Croatia only joined the EU in July 2013. 
6 We also test government expenditures instead of government consumption. 
7 To deal with zero value in inflation rates, we apply the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation used by Arcand, Berkes and 
Panizza (2012) : (𝑥� = ln�𝑥 + √𝑥2 + 1�. 
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but it is now more relevant to include the total of credit to the private sector by deposit 
banks and other financial institutions. We also include the stock market turnover ratio. 
 
To take into account the macroeconomic dimension of financial stability, we include the 
CISS developed by the ECB for the Euro Area. The CISS includes 15 raw measures, mainly 
market-based financial stress, that are split equally into five categories, namely the financial 
intermediaries sector, money markets, equity markets, bond markets and foreign exchange 
markets. The CISS places relatively more weight on situations in which stress prevails 
simultaneously in several market segments. It is unit-free and constrained to lay within the 
unit interval (see Hollo et al., 2012). Unfortunately, this aggregate indicator exists neither at 
the country level nor for the entire EU. However, thanks to strong financial, monetary and 
trade integration in the EU, it is reasonable to assume that the evolution of the 
macroeconomic financial stability in the EU is highly correlated with financial stability in the 
Euro Area, hence the relevance of the CISS. 
 
Moreover, to capture the microeconomic dimension of financial stability, we use some 
aggregate prudential ratios such as the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans which is 
relevant as a warning signal for systemic banking solvency (Cihak and Schaeck, 2010). We 
also test the banking Z-score and stock market volatility.  
 
Finally, we also construct a statistical financial stability index with a Principal Component 
Analysis (FSI-PCA) based on various aggregate prudential ratios8. The first component of 
bank capital to total assets, net interest margin, bank non-performing loans to gross loans, 
stock market capitalization growth rate, return on assets, return on equity and liquid assets                                                         
8  We have also constructed variants of this new financial stability index including or not some prudential ratios. The 
characteristics of the FSI-PCA and the estimation results remain similar. 
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to deposits and short term funding  is estimated with a Principal Component Analysis and is 
therefore a linear combination of the seven preceding variables maximizing the common 
variance explained between these variables. The first component captures most of the 
common variance and the following orthogonal components contain less and less 
information than the preceding components. For the 27 countries of the sample, the first 
component has an eigenvalue (the variance of the component) comprised between 2.75 and 
4.56 (a value superior to one means that the component captures more variance than its 
nominal share of the total variance of variables) and explains between 0.39 and 0.65% of the 
common variance of the series. Measures of sampling adequacy - the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(which compares the partial correlations and correlations between variables) and SMC 
(Squared Multiple Correlations of variables with all other variables) - support the relevance 
of PCA on the selected variables9. Our index of FSI-PCA is negatively correlated with 
variables of financial instability. In that sense, FSI-PCA must be viewed as an indicator of 
financial stability. When the FSI-PCE index increases, financial stability increases. 
All variables are described in Table A in the Appendix. Descriptive statistics are presented 
in Table B and the correlation matrix between all variables is shown in Table C. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1. Methodology 
Following Beck and Levine (2004), we estimate the relationship between finance and GDP 
growth using the GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The regression 
equation can be described in the following form: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛿𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡         (1)                                                         
9 Principal component analysis estimates are available upon request. 
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where subscripts i and t represent respectively country and time period, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡  is the 
dependent variable of economic performance, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 represents its lagged value, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a set 
of explanatory variables typically used in this type of study, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡  includes explanatory 
variables of financial stability and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term that includes country-specific effect 
and time-specific effect. 
 
With this estimated equation, some econometric issues arise. First, variables included in 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 
and 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 may not be fully exogenous and causality may run in both directions. Second, the 
country fixed-effects contained in the error term can be correlated with the explanatory 
variables. Third, the panel dataset has a relative short time dimension and a larger country 
dimension. These three issues can be addressed with the two-step GMM estimator proposed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) in which the set of instrumental variables is constituted by the 
lagged values of all explanatory variables, including 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1. Moreover, Arellano and Bond 
(1991) rewrite equation (1) in first difference: 
Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛾Δ𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛿Δ𝑍𝑖,𝑡 +  Δ𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (2) 
 
By transforming the regressors in first difference, the country fixed-effect is removed, but a 
new bias is potentially introduced: the new error term can be correlated with the lagged 
dependent variable. Under the assumption that the error term is not serially correlated and 
that the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous, Arellano and Bond (1991) define the 
following procedure. In the first step of their GMM estimator, error terms are assumed to be 
homoskedastic and independent over time and across countries. Then, in the second step 
residuals obtained in the first step are used to build a consistent estimate of the variance-
covariance matrix. Assumptions of independence and homoskedasticity are then relaxed, 
making the two-step estimator asymptotically more efficient that the first-step one.  
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We obtain robust standard errors using the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction. The 
assumption of no serial correlation in the error terms is crucial for the consistency of GMM 
estimator. We report the standard specification tests. Failure to reject the null hypothesis of 
the serial correlation tests imply that error terms are not serially correlated.  
 
The use of a large number of instruments may lead to overidentification. In order to avoid it, 
we use variables in level as instruments only up to three lags instead of using all their 
history. The p-value of the Sargan test is included at the bottom of each table of results. We 
do not reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid.  
 
Our estimation strategy differs from earlier ones since we do not use average data in our 
dynamic panel estimations10. Beck and Levine (2004) and Arcand et al. (2012) use average 
data in order to quantify the long term relationship between finance and economic 
performance. Their data are usually averaged over 5-year periods to disentangle credit 
cycles effects. Beyond Ahmed (1998)’s argument, we do not follow this assumption for two 
other reasons. First, business cycles measured by the National Bureau of Economic research 
(NBER) in the United States and by the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) in 
Europe are longer than five years. Measures of financial cycles (Drehmann et al., 2012) show 
that financial cycles have a much lower frequency than the traditional business cycles. Their 
average duration has increased since the 1980’s and is now around 20 years making 5-year 
average data unable to fit the duration of these cycles. Second, it may be worth investigating 
not only the long term effects of finance on economic performance but also its short term 
effects: the use of  average data disregards the latter. 
                                                         
10 More precisely, we only include average data as a robustness check. 
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4.2. Financial Depth and Economic Performance 
In a first step, we replicate on our sample the seminal estimations of the literature. The 
overall fit of the model in column (1) of Table 1 is consistent with Beck and Levine’s (2004). 
Initial economic performance, trade openness and government consumption are significant 
with the usual sign. On the contrary, average years of education and inflation are not 
significant11. Other specifications, with non-linearity and/or other indicators of economic 
performance give relatively similar outcomes.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Quite noteworthy, these first estimations show that the level of financial depth in the EU is 
not a significant positive determinant of economic performance. Estimations with four 
different economic performance measures (GDP growth per capita, household consumption 
growth per capita, disposable income growth per capita and investment growth) all show 
that when financial depth is proxied by the ratio of the amount of credit provided to the 
private sector by banks and other financial institutions over GDP, no improvement in 
economic performance shall be awaited from an increase in allocated credit.  
 
Moreover, this measure of financial depth has sometimes a significant negative effect. These 
results are consistent whith recent works that established a limit for financial depth positive 
effects (Arcand et al., 2012; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012). The latter show that beyond an 
unobserved threshold, negative effects may start to appear. We also performed additional 
estimations including the squared GDP per capita (column 2 of Table 1) or the squared ratio 
of credit to GDP (column 3 of Table 1) to the benchmark model to evidence the potential 
non-linear effects of the levels of economic or financial development. The squared ratios are 
not statistically significant and their inclusion does not affect the previous result.                                                         
11 If the model is specified as a panel with fixed or random effects (see section 4.3), the theoretical “endogenous-growth model” 
seems to fit well the data. In contrast with FE and RE panels, the benchmark model corrects for the endogeneity bias. 
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4.3. Financial Stability and Economic Performance 
We now turn our investigation to the effects of financial stability on aggregate dynamics. 
With the CISS index, we take into account the macroeconomic dimension of financial 
stability. We also test two indicators of microeconomic financial stability, non-performing 
loans and the Z-score. We also test the impact of stock market volatility and our own FSI-
PCA measure. Since microeconomic and macroeconomic dimensions of financial stability 
are strongly linked, we test each micro financial stability measure individually and then 
jointly with the macroeconomic CISS. Estimates are reported in Table 2 for GDP growth, and 
in Tables D, E and F in the Appendix, for consumption growth, disposable income growth 
and investment respectively.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
First, introducing financial stability measures in the model does not affect the impact of 
financial depth: it remains nil when economic performance is proxied by GDP growth per 
capita and it remains often negative when economic performance is proxied by investment 
growth. Second, macroeconomic financial stability, proxied by the CISS, appears negatively 
related to GDP and investment growth. Non-performing loans also have a negative impact 
on GDP, consumption and disposable income growth. Consistently with the Z-score’s limits 
evoked by Cihak et al. (2013), we do not find that this variable affects economic 
performance. The inclusion of stock market volatility is significant only to explain 
investment growth and still with a negative sign. We finally include the FSI-PCA that we 
contructed with aggregate prudential ratios. This variable has a significant and positive 
effect on all dependent variables. Because the FSI-PCA measures financial stability rather 
than instability, the effect means that the deterioration of bank’s aggregate prudential ratios 
impact negatively economic performance, in accordance with former outcomes. 
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To sum up, there is a clear pattern in these data and results for a negative relationship 
between financial instability and economic performance. This relationship is robust to 
different measures of financial stability or instability, and to different measures of economic 
performance. 
 
4.3. Robustness tests 
To assess the sensitivity of our results to data or econometric choices further, we present 
several robustness tests12. First, we include other variables that can proxy financial depth 
like the total assets of deposit banks and of the other financial institutions.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Second, we test the robustness of Arellano-Bond’s estimator. We estimate the equivalent 
empirical model with both fixed- and random-effects. Hausman tests indicated that the 
individual effects and our explanatory variables were systematically related, so that the 
fixed effects (FE, also called within) estimator was the most appropriate choice. The FE 
estimator, which allows for varying intercept terms across countries, deals efficiently with 
unobserved heterogeneity, as time-invariant omitted variables do not bias the regression 
results. This proves especially important when unobservable variables, such as financial 
markets and banking industry characteristics, and regulatory rules and institutions, may be 
important in explaining the effects of financial depth or stability on economic performance. 
A FE estimator has the advantage of controlling for different national effects of stable 
unobserved variables, and over our short sample, we may assume those unobservable 
variables are stable. The appropriateness of our FE estimation was also confirmed by an F-
test for the significance of fixed effects. However, it also often makes sense to treat the 
unobserved effects as random draws from the population, and this approach is appropriate                                                         
12 We only present results for GDP growth. Results for the other measures of economic performance are available upon request 
to the authors.  
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from an omitted variables or heterogeneity perspective. Therefore, we also estimate the 
panel with random-effects (RE). Last, the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
indicated a first order correlation and we therefore use both FE and RE estimators robust to 
an AR disturbance terms. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Third, we take into account the long-term effects pointed out by Beck and Levine (2004) and 
estimate regressions with average variables. To take into account the fact that credit growth 
is cyclical, we split our sample of 14 years in 7 non-overlapping 2-year periods and in 4 non-
overlapping 5-year periods.  
Results are reported in Tables 3 and 4 for the robustness to financial depth indicators and to 
alternative estimators respectively. Table G in the Appendix provides estimates for 2-year 
and 5-year averages. All robustness checks strongly confirm our two main results for the 
EU: first, financial depth does not impinge on economic performance, in the best case, or it 
impinges negatively in the worst; second, financial instability harms economic performance. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the relationship between macroeconomic performance, financial depth 
and financial stability. We assess the finance-economic performance nexus in the EU. We 
base our estimations on Beck and Levine (2004) who developed a dynamic panel estimation 
framework. We show that financial depth does not have a positive effect in the EU. 
Moreover, we find that financial depth can have a negative impact on economic 
performances. This result is, to our knowledge, an innovation. Second, we introduce some 
financial instability indicators that measure the macro and the micro dimension of financial 
stability. We use several types of indicators. One is calculated by the ECB, two are based on 
banking aggregate prudential ratios, one is market-related as it measures the stock market 
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volatility and finally we construct one with a principal component analysis. In most cases, 
the use of these indicators shows that financial instability has a negative effect on economic 
performance, but their inclusion does not reverse the financial depth effect.  
 
These results suggest that financial depth in the EU has now reached a too-high level so that 
finance effects are no longer favourable to economic performance. Moreover, financial 
deepening represents a risk through the damaging effects induced by financial instability. 
Recent banking and sovereign debt crisis illustrate these negative effects. 
 
These results have various policy implications. The argument by bank lobbies, i.e. that 
regulating the size and growth of the financial sector would negatively impact the growth of 
the economies in question, is not supported by the EU data. The need for better micro and 
macro prudential regulations is also demonstrated. In particular, the effect of banks’ non-
performing loans has been shown to be damaging for economic performance, so as 
macroeconomic financial instability. Dealing with micro and macro financial stability, 
through the banking Union for instance or the ECB’s OMT, would participate in improving 
the real economy. 
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Table 1: Benchmark Dynamic Panel Estimations 
 
This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed at estimating the effect of financial depth on four economic performances. All regressions are estimated with annual 
data from 1998 to 2011 using the first-differenced GMM estimator. The bottom of the table reports the p-values of standard specification tests. Robust (Windmeijer) standard errors are in 
brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01. Malta is the missing country in regressions 7, 8 and 9. Data source: World Bank, United Nations, ECB & Eurostat. 
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Table 2: Dynamic Panel estimations – GDP per capita growth rate and Financial Stability 
 
This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed at estimating the effect of financial depth and 
financial instability on GDP per capita growth. All regressions are estimated with annual data from 1998 to 2011 using the 
first-differenced GMM estimator. The bottom of the table reports the p-values of standard specification tests. Robust 
(Windmeijer) standard errors are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01. Austria is the missing country in regressions 
4 and 8. Data source: World Bank, United Nations, ECB & Eurostat. 
GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Private Credit 0 0 -0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Turnover Ratio 0 0 0 0 0 -0.000* 0 0 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
School 0.039 0.162 0.059 0.121 0.155 0.166 0.07 0.099 0.124
[0.10] [0.16] [0.10] [0.11] [0.13] [0.17] [0.11] [0.13] [0.13]
Gov. Consump. -0.349** -0.399** -0.388*** -0.399*** -0.452*** -0.447*** -0.368*** -0.371*** -0.424***
[0.14] [0.17] [0.15] [0.14] [0.11] [0.10] [0.11] [0.11] [0.12]
Inflation rate 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.003
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
Trade Openness 0.316*** 0.21 0.322** 0.239** 0.205 0.159 0.282*** 0.268* 0.296**
[0.11] [0.17] [0.16] [0.11] [0.18] [0.19] [0.10] [0.16] [0.13]
Initial Econ. Perf. -0.112*** -0.139*** -0.123** -0.099** -0.114* -0.126** -0.114*** -0.089* -0.135***
[0.04] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.07] [0.06] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
CISS -0.054** -0.043** -0.04 -0.044 -0.034
[0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Non Perf. Loans -0.011*** -0.010**
[0.00] [0.00]
Z-score 0.001 0
[0.00] [0.00]
Volatility 0 0
[0.00] [0.00]
FSI-PCA 0.003* 0.003*
[0.00] [0.00]
Constant 0.926 1.502** 1.107* 1.054* 1.406** 1.669*** 1.064* 0.829 1.214*
[0.70] [0.73] [0.62] [0.61] [0.58] [0.48] [0.55] [0.62] [0.68]
Sargan test p-val. 0,99 0,99 0,99 0,99 0,99 0,99 0,99 0,99 0,99
AR1 0,02 0,04 0,03 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,04 0,02 0,02
AR2 0,08 0,19 0,24 0,00 0,29 0,16 0,10 0,01 0,07
Countries 27 27 27 26 27 27 27 26 27
Obs 246 219 245 206 214 219 245 206 214
    
 
  
25 
 
Table 3: Robustness – Financial Depth 
 
This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed at estimating the effect of financial depth and 
financial instability on GDP growth per capita. We test in particular various indicators of financial depth. We include the 
deposit money bank assets to GDP (%). We also include the sum of the pension fund assets to GDP + mutual fund assets to 
GDP + insurance assets to GDP. This sum is called “non bank’s assets”. Financial assets are the sum of the deposit banks 
assets and the non bank’s assets. All regressions are estimated with annual data from 1998 to 2011 using the first-
differenced GMM estimator. The bottom of the table reports the p-values of standard specification tests. Robust 
(Windmeijer) standard errors are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01. Malta is missing in all regressions and 
Austria is missing in regressions 8 and 10. Data source: World Bank, United Nations, ECB & Eurostat. 
 
GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Private Credit 0
[0.00]
Deposit Banks assets -0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Non bank’s assets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Financial assets 0 0
[0.00] [0.00]
Squared Fin. assets 0
[0.00]
Turnover Ratio 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
School 0.101 0.055 0.089 0.016 0.084 0.057 0.043 -0.052 0.224 0.121
[0.07] [0.25] [0.24] [0.18] [0.16] [0.14] [0.17] [0.30] [0.16] [0.14]
Gov. Consump. -0.373** -0.433*** -0.446*** -0.429*** -0.335** -0.496*** -0.387*** -0.349*** -0.415*** -0.455***
[0.18] [0.14] [0.16] [0.13] [0.15] [0.13] [0.14] [0.13] [0.14] [0.17]
Inflation rate 0.005 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.005 0.003 0.002 0 0.002 0.008
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Trade Openness 0.258 0.476 0.471 0.528 0.439* 0.302* 0.486* 0.476** 0.277 0.109
[0.17] [0.32] [0.30] [0.33] [0.26] [0.18] [0.27] [0.21] [0.18] [0.14]
Initial Econ. Perf. -0.106 -0.289*** -0.294*** -0.313*** -0.255** -0.199*** -0.264*** -0.199*** -0.135** -0.074
[0.07] [0.10] [0.09] [0.11] [0.10] [0.06] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.09]
CISS -0.057** -0.024
[0.03] [0.05]
Non Perf. Loans -0.013*** -0.010*
[0.00] [0.01]
Z-score 0.001 0.001
[0.00] [0.00]
Volatility -0.002*** 0
[0.00] [0.00]
FSI-PCA 0.003 0
[0.00] [0.00]
Constant 1.054 2.175*** 2.210*** 2.297*** 1.654*** 2.227*** 1.842*** 1.381*** 1.059* 1.478**
[0.65] [0.58] [0.62] [0.43] [0.58] [0.46] [0.60] [0.48] [0.56] [0.73]
Sargan test p-val. 1,00 0,99 0,99 0,99 0,99 0,99 0,99 0,99 0,99 1,00
AR1 0,10 0,03 0,02 0,04 0,00 0,06 0,03 0,01 0,02 0,08
AR2 0,27 0,07 0,07 0,08 0,06 0,38 0,08 0,07 0,18 0,13
Countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 25 26 25
Obs 225 249 249 249 249 229 248 208 202 174
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Table 4: Robustness – Alternative Estimators 
 
This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed at estimating the effect of financial depth and financial instability on GDP Growth 
per capita. All regressions are with annual data from 1998 to 2011 fixed or random effects. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01. Data source: World Bank, United 
Nations, ECB & Eurostat. 
GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Private Credit 0 0 -0.001*** 0 0 -0.001*** 0 -0.000*** 0 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Turnover Ratio 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.000* 0.000* 0 0 0.000* 0 0 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
School 0.214*** 0.255*** 0.343*** 0.207** 0.181* 0.323*** 0.291*** 0.036 0.069** 0.058* 0.034 0.032 0.04 0.078**
[0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.09] [0.08] [0.09] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Gov. Consump. -0.379*** -0.323*** -0.178*** -0.381*** -0.379*** -0.220*** -0.238*** -0.154*** -0.092*** -0.145*** -0.153*** -0.096*** -0.137*** -0.098***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.05] [0.07] [0.08] [0.06] [0.06] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Inflation rate 0.011** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.011** 0.008 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.017***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Trade Openness 0.238*** 0.208*** 0.255*** 0.243*** 0.231*** 0.241*** 0.213*** 0.030** 0.021* 0.003 0.029** 0.017 0.012 -0.004
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Initial Econ. Perf. -0.167*** -0.135*** -0.121*** -0.168*** -0.153*** -0.111*** -0.097*** -0.017** -0.017*** -0.035*** -0.016** -0.021*** -0.016** -0.029***
[0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
CISS -0.084*** -0.125*** -0.133*** -0.095***
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02]
Non Perf. Loans -0.005*** -0.005** -0.006*** -0.005***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Z-score 0.001 0.001 0 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Volatility -0.001*** 0 -0.002*** -0.001***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
FSI-PCA 0.004*** 0 0.005*** 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Constant 1.370*** 0.913*** 0.016 1.379*** 1.362*** 0.118*** 0.189** 0.479*** 0.254** 0.713*** 0.480*** 0.457*** 0.480*** 0.510***
[0.20] [0.22] [0.06] [0.21] [0.25] [0.04] [0.08] [0.13] [0.11] [0.12] [0.13] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12]
R² adj. 0.37 0.39 0.35 0.37 0.41 0.35 0.47 - - - - - - -
R² within 0.45 0.47 0.44 0.45 0.49 0.44 0.56 0.28 0.34 0.41 0.28 0.39 0.38 0.52
R² between 0.69 0.66 0.65 0.69 0.65 0.68 0.56 0.59 0.73 0.76 0.60 0.73 0.73 0.85
Obs. 293 293 264 291 237 257 215 320 320 291 318 263 284 241
Fixed Effect Random Effect
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A: Data Description and Sources 
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Table B: Summary Descriptive Statistics of the main variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP Growth rate per capita 378 0,054 0,067 -0,200 0,288
Consumption Growth rate per capita 375 0,053 0,064 -0,217 0,288
Disposable Income Growth per capita 355 0,053 0,070 -0,214 0,270
Investment Growth rate 372 0,025 0,109 -0,503 0,479
School 378 2,302 0,141 1,792 2,573
Inflation 378 1,703 0,784 -1,301 4,772
Trade Openness 374 3,995 0,459 3,202 5,223
Government Consumption 378 2,995 0,145 2,542 3,395
Private credit to GDP in % 344 93,149 57,667 6,383 288,109
Turnover ratio 378 61,804 52,974 0,139 259,593
Composite Indicator of systemic stress 351 0,214 0,160 0,066 0,560
Z-score 376 12,500 7,768 -3,449 40,862
Non performing loans 343 4,746 5,011 0,100 31,600
Stock markets volatility 295 26,104 10,410 11,503 65,187
FSI-PCA 332 0,159 3,783 -29,396 8,147
Economic performance (i.e. dependent variable)
Seminal independent variables
Financial Depth indicators
Financial stability indicators
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Table C: Correlations of the main variables 
 
This table reports the correlation coefficients between the main variables used in this paper. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01. Data source: World Bank, United Nations, ECB & Eurostat. 
GDP 
/cap.
Cons. 
/cap.
Disp. 
Income 
/cap.
Invest. School Inflation
Trade 
Open.
Gov. 
Cons.
Private 
credit
Turnover 
ratio
CISS Z-score
Non 
Perform. 
Loans
Volat. FSI-PCA
GDP/cap. 1
Consumption/cap. 0,94*** 1
Disposable Income/cap. 0,95*** 0,91*** 1
Investment 0,66*** 0,59*** 0,64*** 1
School 0,03 0,01 0,02 0,11** 1
Inflation 0,39*** 0,41*** 0,43*** 0,26*** 0,05 1
Trade Openness 0,15*** 0,11* 0,12** 0,03 0,52*** 0,08 1
Govern. Consumption -0,31*** -0,27*** -0,28*** -0,2*** 0,17*** -0,32*** -0,16*** 1
Private credit -0,48*** -0,47*** -0,48*** -0,36*** -0,04*** -0,39*** 0,02 0,15*** 1
Turnover ratio -0,23*** -0,22*** -0,24*** -0,04 -0,07 -0,16*** -0,46*** 0,34*** 0,28*** 1
CISS -0,46*** -0,36*** -0,44*** -0,53*** 0,26*** -0,1* 0,11** 0,17*** 0,34*** 0 1
Z-score -0,07 -0,1* -0,1* 0,07 -0,17*** -0,15*** 0,02 0,02 0,08 0,14*** -0,09* 1
Non performing loans -0,13*** -0,13** -0,13** -0,22*** 0 0,08 -0,1* -0,1* -0,23*** -0,18*** 0,09 -0,27*** 1
Volatility -0,4*** -0,35*** -0,4*** -0,45*** 0,08 -0,07 -0,05 0,17*** 0,03 -0,02 0,55*** -0,07 0,24*** 1
FSI-PCA 0,47*** 0,46*** 0,46*** 0,42*** 0,05 0,28*** 0,15*** -0,11* -0,32*** -0,11*** -0,26*** 0,15** -0,6*** -0,24*** 1
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Table D: Dynamic Panel estimations –  
Consumption per capita growth and Financial Stability 
 
This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed at estimating the effect of financial depth and 
financial instability on consumption growth per capita. All regressions are estimated with annual data from 1998 to 2011 
using the first-differenced GMM estimator. The bottom of the table reports the p-values of standard specification tests. 
Robust (Windmeijer) standard errors are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01. Austria is the missing country in 
regressions 4 and 8. Data source: World Bank, United Nations, ECB & Eurostat. 
  
Consumption (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Private Credit -0.001 0 0 0 0 0 -0.001 -0.001 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Turnover Ratio 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
School 0.051 0.049 0.061 -0.102 0.12 0.054 0.046 -0.002 0.111
[0.07] [0.11] [0.09] [0.14] [0.12] [0.08] [0.05] [0.10] [0.09]
Gov. Consump. -0.198* -0.172* -0.17 -0.114 -0.229 -0.161 -0.205 -0.208 -0.287**
[0.12] [0.10] [0.30] [0.21] [0.32] [0.12] [0.14] [0.13] [0.13]
Inflation rate 0.009* 0.018** 0.008 0.014** 0.01 0.015*** 0.011* 0.014*** 0.014***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01]
Trade Openness 0.235** 0.164* 0.303 0.241 0.272 0.179* 0.210** 0.098 0.177
[0.10] [0.09] [0.20] [0.18] [0.23] [0.11] [0.10] [0.13] [0.12]
Initial Econ. Perf. -0.109*** -0.115** -0.148*** -0.044 -0.152*** -0.109** -0.101*** -0.023 -0.126**
[0.04] [0.05] [0.05] [0.08] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.07] [0.05]
CISS 0.03 0.03 0.026 0.049 0.018
[0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Non Perf. Loans -0.007*** -0.008
[0.00] [0.01]
Z-score 0.001 0.001
[0.00] [0.00]
Volatility 0 -0.001
[0.00] [0.00]
FSI-PCA 0.003* 0.003
[0.00] [0.00]
Constant 0.668 0.893* 0.622 0.175 0.811 0.776 0.725 0.617 1.124*
[0.51] [0.51] [1.17] [1.14] [1.42] [0.58] [0.55] [0.55] [0.64]
Sargan test p-val. 0,99 0,99 0,98 0,99 0,98 0,99 0,99 0,99 0,99
AR1 0,03 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,03 0,07 0,07 0,02
AR2 0,26 0,21 0,38 0,49 0,20 0,19 0,60 0,44 0,38
Countries 27 27 27 26 27 27 27 26 27
Obs 243 216 243 205 212 216 243 205 212
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Table E: Dynamic Panel estimations –  
Disposable Income per capita growth and Financial Stability 
 
This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed at estimating the effect of financial depth and 
financial instability on disposable income per capita growth. All regressions are estimated with annual data from 1998 to 
2011 using the first-differenced GMM estimator. The bottom of the table reports the p-values of standard specification tests. 
Robust (Windmeijer) standard errors are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01. Malta is missing in all regressions 
and Austria and Luxembourg are missing in regressions 3 and 8. Data source: World Bank, United Nations, ECB & 
Eurostat. 
  
Disposable Income (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Private Credit 0 0 0 -0.001 0 0 0 0 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Turnover Ratio 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
School -0.008 0.04 0.051 -0.033 0.061 -0.002 -0.021 -0.049 0.03
[0.13] [0.16] [0.16] [0.19] [0.18] [0.14] [0.12] [0.12] [0.10]
Gov. Consump. -0.288*** -0.352*** -0.362*** -0.253 -0.444*** -0.292*** -0.281** -0.299*** -0.397***
[0.11] [0.11] [0.13] [0.19] [0.08] [0.10] [0.12] [0.11] [0.10]
Inflation rate 0.009** 0.009 0.009* 0.007 0.01 0.011** 0.008 0.014 0.01
[0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Trade Openness 0.279** 0.259* 0.22 0.428 0.224* 0.248 0.27 0.216 0.242
[0.12] [0.16] [0.18] [0.34] [0.13] [0.16] [0.19] [0.19] [0.17]
Initial Econ. Perf. -0.118** -0.157*** -0.096 -0.135 -0.122*** -0.123*** -0.102 -0.06 -0.124**
[0.05] [0.05] [0.07] [0.12] [0.04] [0.05] [0.07] [0.07] [0.05]
CISS -0.028 -0.029 -0.031 -0.019 -0.036
[0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04]
Non Perf. Loans -0.007 -0.006**
[0.00] [0.00]
Z-score 0.001 0
[0.00] [0.00]
Volatility 0 0
[0.00] [0.00]
FSI-PCA 0.003*** 0.003***
[0.00] [0.00]
Constant 1.028** 1.566*** 1.137 0.57 1.538*** 1.226** 0.957* 0.87 1.452**
[0.46] [0.57] [0.70] [1.02] [0.56] [0.54] [0.53] [0.67] [0.59]
Sargan test p-val. 0,99 0,99 0,99 0,96 0,99 0,99 0,99 1,00 1,00
AR1 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,00 0,03 0,02 0,05 0,03 0,04
AR2 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,16 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,05 0,01
Countries 26 26 26 24 26 26 26 24 26
Obs 223 199 223 187 195 199 223 187 195
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Table F: Dynamic Panel estimations - Investment growth and Financial Stability 
 
This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed at estimating the effect of financial depth and 
financial instability on investment. All regressions are estimated with annual data from 1998 to 2011 using the first-
differenced GMM estimator. The bottom of the table reports the p-values of standard specification tests. Robust (Windmeijer) 
standard errors are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01. Austria is the missing country in regressions 4 and 8. Data 
source: World Bank, United Nations, ECB & Eurostat. 
Investment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Private Credit -0.001* -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001 0 -0.001
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Turnover Ratio 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
School 0.268 0.478 0.624*** 0.335 0.728** 0.245 0.454 0.313 0.266
[0.27] [0.30] [0.22] [0.26] [0.30] [0.21] [0.28] [0.30] [0.26]
Gov. Consump. -0.630** -0.846*** -0.813*** -0.748*** -0.825*** -0.573*** -0.741*** -0.525 -0.626***
[0.25] [0.17] [0.18] [0.20] [0.14] [0.22] [0.28] [0.38] [0.23]
Inflation rate 0.017* 0.008 0.014*** 0.01 0.01 0.020** 0.015 0.019 0.012
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
Trade Openness 0.207 0.022 0.203 0.016 0.067 0.17 0.16 0.149 0.186
[0.19] [0.18] [0.13] [0.16] [0.12] [0.19] [0.21] [0.20] [0.22]
Initial Econ. Perf. 0 -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** 0 0 -0.000* 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
CISS -0.214*** -0.188*** -0.204*** -0.178* -0.160**
[0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.10] [0.07]
Non Perf. Loans -0.009 -0.007
[0.01] [0.00]
Z-score 0.001 0
[0.00] [0.00]
Volatility -0.002*** -0.001
[0.00] [0.00]
FSI-PCA 0.007*** 0.006*
[0.00] [0.00]
Constant 0.612 1.712** 0.548 1.644 0.931* 0.684 0.734 0.411 0.72
[1.04] [0.76] [0.77] [1.20] [0.55] [1.17] [1.02] [1.54] [1.00]
Sargan test p-val. 0,99 0,97 1,00 0,98 0,99 0,99 0,99 0,98 0,98
AR1 0,01 0,02 0,11 0,03 0,03 0,00 0,03 0,01 0,02
AR2 0,40 0,16 0,08 0,17 0,01 0,08 0,48 0,18 0,19
Countries 27 27 27 26 27 27 27 26 27
Obs 240 216 240 202 212 216 240 202 212
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Table G: Robustness tests – 2-year and 5-year Averages 
 
This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed at estimating the effect of financial depth and financial instability on GDP Growth per 
capita. All regressions are estimated 2-year non-overlapping average data from 1998 to 2011 using the first-differenced GMM estimator. The bottom of the table 
reports the p-values of standard specification tests. Robust (Windmeijer) standard errors are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01. Austria is missing in 
regressions 6, 7 and Cyprus in 7. Data source: World Bank, United Nations, ECB & Eurostat. 
GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Private Credit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Turnover Ratio 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* 0 -0.000*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
School 0.411* 0.511* 0.407** 0.434* 0.416* 0.408** 0.522*** 0.141 0.146 0.141* 0.124 0.145* 0.098 0.027
[0.23] [0.27] [0.18] [0.23] [0.23] [0.18] [0.16] [0.10] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.10] [0.07]
Gov. Consump. -0.376*** -0.346*** -0.283* -0.339*** -0.317** -0.276* -0.263** -0.181** -0.187** -0.237*** -0.165** -0.162*** -0.177* -0.201**
[0.14] [0.12] [0.15] [0.11] [0.13] [0.16] [0.12] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.10] [0.09]
Inflation rate -0.001 -0.005 0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.005 -0.015 0.007 0.006 -0.003 0.002 0.006 0 0.001
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02]
Trade Openness 0.148 0.142 0.065 0.145 0.136 0.077 -0.07 0.166* 0.171** 0.06 0.190** 0.164 0.169** 0.05
[0.11] [0.11] [0.08] [0.11] [0.12] [0.14] [0.09] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.10] [0.08] [0.08]
Initial Econ. Perf. -0.232*** -0.201*** -0.167*** -0.249*** -0.182*** -0.155*** -0.036 -0.124*** -0.127*** -0.100*** -0.127*** -0.126*** -0.137*** -0.102**
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04]
CISS -0.082 -0.016 0.006 0.083
[0.05] [0.06] [0.04] [0.12]
Non Perf. Loans -0.008*** -0.010** -0.004*** -0.003
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Z-score 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Volatility -0.002** -0.002* 0 -0.001
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
FSI-PCA 0.005** 0 -0.002 -0.001
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Constant 1.969*** 1.374** 1.436** 1.948*** 1.377** 1.215*** 0.483 0.829 0.844* 1.194*** 0.781 0.791* 1.044** 1.443**
[0.53] [0.54] [0.61] [0.49] [0.60] [0.29] [0.84] [0.53] [0.46] [0.41] [0.49] [0.48] [0.48] [0.58]
Sargan test p-val. 0,21 0,12 0,28 0,23 0,17 0,25 0,91 0,05 0,12 0,27 0,15 0,09 0,09 0,62
AR1 0,09 0,04 0,11 0,06 0,05 0,00 0,01 0,29 0,31 0,07 0,38 0,26 0,30 0,12
AR2 0,67 0,62 0,31 0,98 0,51 0,08 0,07 - - - - - - -
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 26 25 27 27 27 27 27 27 26
Obs 73 73 67 73 70 65 62 53 53 52 53 49 52 49
2-year Average 5-year Average
